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Abstract
This Essay starts by laying out the shortcomings of the WTO. In Part II it lays out the issues
at stake in the Seattle Conference. Part III is about the effects of the “Seattle fiasco.” Part IV gives
the author’s views on what a development round should be. Part V asserts that the WTO should
promote fair labor standards. Finally, Part VI discusses the prospects for the WTO to address
concerns of developing nations.
THE WTO FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF
A DEVELOPING COUNTRY
Ambassador Celso L. N. Amorim*
INTRODUCTION
A few decades ago the world trading system was regarded by
the developing countries as fundamentally flawed and unfair.
Different regimes, irrespective of their professed leanings to the
right or the left, followed similar policies based on state interven-
tion and the insulation of the domestic market (to the extent
possible) from the pressures of external competition. In many
cases, sacrifices were asked from, or even imposed on, popula-
tions largely deprived of their political rights.
This panorama has changed dramatically. All but a few de-
veloping countries have become thriving democracies. Human
rights and sustainable development are prominent on the do-
mestic, as well as the international, agendas of many countries
from the South. Illusions of a radical transformation of the
world trading system, epitomized in the notion of a new eco-
nomic order, have given way to a more sober and realistic ap-
proach based on the possibility of continuous incremental gains.
At the same time, "competitive integration," and not the quest
for self-sufficiency, became the unifying concept driving the de-
cision-making process in developing countries in economic mat-
ters. As a consequence, barriers to the importation of foreign
goods were either scrapped or dramatically reduced, internal
regulations were made investment friendly, and sound
macroeconomic policies were actively pursued, sometimes with
great success.
In this process, developing countries discovered, or in some
cases rediscovered, the value of a rule-based multilateral trading
system, which fosters predictability and mitigates the effects of
unilateralism. They also realized that it was more convenient to
negotiate in a forum where a multiplicity of forces interact and
often neutralize each other than on a bilateral basis.
Therefore, not only in rhetoric, but in practice as well, de-
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veloping countries have been adjusting to a system that they
rightly feel entitled to influence, at least to a limited degree,
even though they did not shape the system.
It is often argued that much of this adjustment was under-
taken in their own interest, and this may be true to some extent.
But it also would be fair for developing countries to expect that
such momentous efforts, brought about in many instances at a
high socio-political cost, be matched by concrete actions on the
part of developed nations. The way the system is operating, un-
fortunately, does not allow us to say that this reciprocity has
taken place. Not to any significant extent, anyway.
I. THE SHORTCOMINGS OF THE SYSTEM: THE
'DEVELOPMENT DEFICIT" IN THE WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION' ("WTa')
An analysis of recent data demonstrates that the Multilateral
Trading System is failing to play a constructive role in terms of
global income distribution. As a matter of fact, comparing
figures concerning the participation of different groups of coun-
tries in the world trade, from 1994 to 1998, one can verify that
the volume of total trade of the developed countries increased
by about 33%, whereas the volume of total trade of the develop-
ing countries increased by only 20%, according todata from the
UNCTAD. It is noteworthy that the period in question already
reflects, to some extent, the results of the Uruguay Round. This
seriously casts doubt on the validity of the argument frequently
put forward by developed countries that poor nations have bene-
fited considerably from the negotiations.
This does not mean that there were no positive results for
developing countries from the Uruguay Round. One might say
that tariff reductions have benefited their exports, even if mar-
ginally so. The establishment and/or strengthening of rules, in-
cluding those concerning dispute settlement, has provided the
system with greater predictability. This has brought benefits to
all parties.
Developing countries today, however, have a genuine feel-
ing of disproportion between their efforts to liberalize and their
1. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, LEGAL
INSTRUMENTs-RESuLTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 1, 33 I.L.M. 1144 (1994)
[hereinafter WTO Agreement].
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efforts to subject their policies to internationally agreed upon
rules (mostly inspired by developed countries) in areas such as
intellectual property and the lack of commensurate measures on
the part of their counterparts in the developed world. There
still remains countless examples of tariff barriers and other ob-
stacles applied by developed countries that affect precisely those
products in which poor countries would have a chance to com-
pete.
Two sectors illustrate this situation: agriculture and textiles.
The case of agriculture shows how traditional barriers can be
used, together with new imaginative concepts, to hamper the ac-
cess of developing countries to the agricultural commodities
market. The first consideration that arises, in this respect, is on
the "rationale" for agricultural products (and the same argu-
ment would be valid for textiles) to be singled out from all the
other goods and to be given a distinct treatment. It is easy, but
essentially false, to reply to this question by pointing to the "po-
litical sensitivity" of this sector. This view is so obviously one-
sided that it would seem almost superfluous to state that, in
adopting the results of the Uruguay Round, developing coun-
tries have accepted disciplines in equally sensitive areas from
their point of view, and that industrial policies, as much as agri-
cultural ones, also have social, environmental, and cultural im-
pacts.' Nevertheless, most developing countries have acknowl-
edged the n6tion that those sacrifices constituted the price to bepaid in exchange for efficiency gains that would spread through-
out the system.
Developing countries have thus undergone a painful adjust-
ment process. It could only be hoped that developed countries
would show the same degree of commitment to liberalization in
sectors that they deem to be more sensitive. That does not, un-
fortunately, seem to be the case. Developed countries not only
keep on making use of some traditional barriers in these sensi-
tive areas, such as quotas and tariff peaks, but also continue to
evolve new concepts to justify their protectionist policies. The
notion of "multifunctionality" of agriculture, put forward most
notably by-the European Union and Japan, is a good example of
such tendencies.
The situation of the textile and clothing sector is another
outstanding eximple of the lack of political will of developed
countries to allow for free competition in their own markets.
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This is a sector in which protectionist measures with the objec-
tive of artificially upholding obsolete industries have prevailed
for decades. Unfortunately, during the Uruguay Round, it was
not possible to negotiate that "normal" provisions for this sector
should replace the previous discriminatory arrangements, at the
same time as the other WTO agreements were put into force.
The current Agreement on Textiles and Clothing 2 determines
the complete integration of the sector in the year 2005, but,
based on experience, many developing countries fear that the
existing quotas might be replaced by other measures that have a
similar impact.
Beyond textiles and agriculture, steel is another sector in
which exports from developing countries have been continu-
ously subject to harassment. In this case, the constant abuse of
trade remedies, especially anti-dumping measures, has rendered
the sector another painful exception to free trade.
Therefore, developing countries have either reaped very
small concessions in the areas of their greatest interest or have
seen such concessions nullified by restrictive trading practices.
In contrast, the results of the negotiations included texts with
provisions that incorporated very strong commitments to be ob-
served by developing countries that were not fully prepared to
undertake those adjustments so speedily.
The obligations contained in some of the agreements, such
as the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Prop-
erty Rights3 ("TRIPs"), the Agreement on Subsidies and Coun-
tervailing Duties,4 and the Agreement on Trade-Related Invest-
ment Measures5 ("TRIMs"), entailed the need for changes in do-
mestic laws and regulations and, ultimately, restricted the ability
of those countries to pursue industrial policy objectives. Many of
the instruments traditionally used, such as subsidies and local
content requirements, were either severely restrained or totally
prohibited. The fact that there are special and differential treat-
2. See Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, An-
nex IA, at http://www.wto.org/english/docse/legal-e/final_e.htm.
3. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, WTO Agreement, Annex IC, art. 4, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URU-
GUAY ROUND vol. 31, 33 l.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS].
4. Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO
Agreement, Annex IA, at http://www.wto.org/english/docse/legale/final-e.htm.
5. Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agree-
ment, Annex IA, at http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal_e/finale.htm.
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ment provisions in some of the agreements does not alter this
picture, since most of these provisions do not go beyond al-
lowing for additional (frequently short) time periods for the ad-
aptation of developing countries to the new rules.
II. THE ISSUES AT STAKE IN SEATTLE
The Seattle Conference ("the Conference") was held in an
environment of frustration of developing countries with the re-
sults of past negotiations. Although the causes of the failure of
the Conference have to be looked for elsewhere, such feeling,
together with the activism of certain anti-globalization groups
from the developed countries and the inflexible positions of
their own governments on a wide array of issues, contributed to
create an atmosphere of pessimism, which led to the final dead-
lock.
If one looks at the background and preparation process of
the Conference, the prospects for its success were never bright.
The WTO was targeted by all kinds of criticism, ranging from the
alleged negative impact of its rules on the macroeconomic per-
formance of Members, mainly with regards to unemployment
rates and economic growth, to issues such as its alleged disregard
for environment and labor standards and lack of transparency.
The sheer complexity of the agenda of the meeting also
played a prominent role in its failure. As the Multilateral Trad-
ing System evolved, it became increasingly broader and more
complex. Progressively, the agenda of discussions in the old
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade6 ("GATT"), and now
in the WTO, did not limit itself to traditional market access is-
sues. Whatever one may think of such tendency in terms of "gov-
ernance" of international economic relations, this diversity of
themes multiplied potential divergences among Members.
Basically, the issues at stake in Seattle could be divided into
three broad categories. Two of them-the so-called "built-in-
agenda" and the implementation issues-are directly related
with the results of the Uruguay Round. The third involved the
Singapore issues.
The "built-in" agenda covered certain commitments, em-
bodied in the texts of the Round, due for negotiations on a fu-
6. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, T.I.A.S.
1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194.
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ture date. This was the case, most notably, of agriculture and
services.
Implementation issues were connected with those agree-
ments of the WTO that, especially from the point of view of de-
veloping countries, required revision as a result of perceived
shortcomings and imbalances. Suggestions on implementation
ranged from proposals to allow for greater flexibility in the use
of certain provisions of the Uruguay Round Agreements (first
and foremost those related to transition periods) to efforts to
reduce the degree of discretion countries, especially the devel-
oped ones, enjoy in pursuing trade objectives. Examples of this
latter category are the proposals related to anti-dumping and
rules of origin.
The third group of issues discussed in Seattle has its inclu-
sion in the WTO agenda traced back to the 1996 Singapore Min-
isterial. Apart from the traditional negotiations on market ac-
cess for industrial goods, this category includes themes such as
investment, competition policy, transparency in government
procurement, and trade facilitation, which gathered variable
levels of support among Members. There also was significant
discussion related to other new issues, such as E-Commerce, the
environment, and the alleged link between trade and labor stan-
dards, which proved to be highly controversial.
The well-known course of events postponed all the discus-
sions to a moment in which circumstances would be more
favorable.
III. THE POST-SEATTLE SCENARIO
The effects of the "Seattle fiasco" on the future of the whole
multilateral trading system have been the object of much specu-
lation. Hypotheses about the death of multilateralism have been
raised. Following this line of thinking, regional initiatives would
play the prominent role in foreign trade relations in the future.
Reality, however, is much more complex, and the system has
mustered strength from decades of experience in dealing with
crises of all sorts. Although some wounds remain unhealed, the
WTO carried out some important activities in the course of
2000. Among those, the launching of the negotiations on agri-
culture and services (the "built-in agenda") should be singled
[Vol. 24:95
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out. The ongoing discussions on an "implementation package"
also deserve to be highlighted.
The negotiations on agriculture, launched in the beginning
of 2000, are based on Article 20 of the Agreement on Agricul-
ture.7 This instrument, in reality, constituted the first effort to
discipline the trade in agricultural goods multilaterally and to
bridge the gap between the treatment of this sector and that of
industrial goods. The perception, even then, that the results of
these efforts had fallen behind the expectations of exporting
countries resulted in the adoption of Article 20, which mandated
the continuation of the process of liberalization in the agricul-
ture sector from January 2000.
The proposals of the Cairns Group, which congregates ex-
porting countries (both developing and developed), have been
instrumental in giving impulse to this process. These proposals
aim at ensuring greater market access as well as improving the
conditions for fair trade in agricultural products by eliminating
certain forms of subsidies (such as export subsidies) and impos-
ing strict disciplines on other modalities of governmental sup-
port to farmers in developed countries.
The other mandated negotiations, also launched in the be-
ginning of 2000, deal with the area of services, which, in general,
is not regarded as a priority for most developing countries.
There is a perception, however, that some issues, such as liberali-
zation measures leading to freer movement of natural persons,
would offer developing countries considerable benefits. In any
case, developing countries are assuming a positive and construc-
tive attitude regarding this exercise, which has been translated in
the presentation of many proposals.
In parallel with these activities, a great amount of time was
dedicated throughout the second semester of 2000 to the so-
called implementation issues. In this case, however, the results
so far have been frustrating. For substantive as well as tactical
reasons, developed countries have not displayed political will to
support the adoption of meaningful measures at this stage.
IV. THE MEANING OF A DEVELOPMENT ROUND
In spite of all of the problems, the idea of a new round re-
7. Agreement on Agriculture, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex IA, art. 20,
at http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/final_e.htm.
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mains alive. The prospect of future comprehensive negotiations
is still significantly underlying current discussions. Whatever is
said for rhetoric or "posturing" purposes, delegates in Geneva
are generally aware of the fact that no major progress will be
possible in the mandated negotiations or in the area of imple-
mentation without the momentum that only a broad round can
bring about. So, the question is not so much whether there will
be a round, but rather what kind of round. From developing
countries' point of view, this is the question that has to be ex-
amined.... .
It is difficult and probably hazardous to define a single posi-
tion or attitude on the part of developing countries vis-a-vis a
new round of trade negotiations. Situations and interests vary
considerably. Generally speaking, support for a new round has
been greater on the part of countries that are strong agricultural
exporters (i.e., Brazil and other members of the Cairns Group)
and/or enjoy a greater degree of integration with developed
markets (i.e., Mexico). But it is fair to say that, in general, devel-
oping countries have mixed feelings about a new round of nego-
tiations.
A round is seen by some as a good opportunity for the cor-
rection of the imbalances that resulted from the Uruguay Round
and for enhancing market access opportunities in the developed
countries. But one has to admit that there also are some per-
ceived risks. Many developing countries fear they will be forced
to accept liberalization commitments, in addition to those they
have painfully incorporated as a result of previous rounds. In
many countries, there is the fear of a "second liberalization
shock" for which they would not be prepared. Conversely, in the
case of subjects that have not been part of the trade system so
far, there is a strong concern that new disciplines would be used
to promote protectionist policies (i.e., environment and labor).
In any case, if developing countries are to be attracted to
the idea of a new round, the development dimension should
play an important role (and not only as rhetorical lip-service) in
view of the widespread notion that the Uruguay Round pro-
duced a considerable imbalance between rights and obligations
of developing countries and those of developed ones, a percep-
tion that largely has been supported by existing figures.
In a sense, it is understandable, but not necessarily justifia-
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ble, why the results of the Uruguay Round were not balanced.
Not only did developing countries have inherently less bargain-
ing power, but their position was aggravated further by the pre-
vailing ideology that placed an emphasis on the need to do away
with "outdated" models of development, based on import substi-
tution, state intervention, and import controls. Additionally,
most developing countries lacked the experience of operating in
an aggressively competitive market. This led to the acceptance
of rules, or lack thereof, which later appeared to be either un-
realistic or unfair, or both. The Brazilian experience in its dis-
pute with Canada dealing with the inadequacy and lack of trans-
parency of rules on exports credits involving civil aircraft is a
case in point. Because the WTO agreements refer this subject to
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
("OECD") arrangements and since those were tailor-made to the
needs and practices of developed countries, which dispose of
means not available to developing countries, the latter are put in
a permanent disadvantage, especially in areas that require large
investment, such as products of high technology.
As pointed out earlier, there is also great dissatisfaction with
the implementation of the Uruguay Round commitments on the
part of developed countries in some more traditional areas, such
as textiles and agriculture. In terms of market access, the reality
is that the playing field is not level. Tariff and quota restrictions
continue to deny access to the exports of developing countries.
A development round would have to address tariff peaks and
tariff escalation, as well as several aspects of WTO rules. In the
context of Seattle, for instance, a coalition of developing coun-
tries, known as the "like-minded," put forward a number of pro-
posals ranging from TRIPs to rules of origin.' Brazil, itself, has
presented proposals in this respect, namely in the cases of subsi-
dies, anti-dumping,9 and TRIMs.
V. THE NEW ISSUES: THE CASE OF "LABOR STANDARDS"
In the course of the discussions leading to Seattle, and in
8. See Agreement on Rules of Origin, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex IA,
at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/finale.htm.
9. See Agreement on the Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex IA, at http://
www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal-e/final e.htm.
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Seattle itself, a number of issues appeared to be particularly diffi-
cult from the point of view of developing countries. I shall illus-
trate these concerns with the question of "labor," keeping in
mind that much of the argumentation on this issue can also be
applied, from a structural point of view, to the subject of the
environment.
The promotion of fair and adequate labor standards is a
goal that every government should pursue. However, there is a
real risk that the ideal of adequate labor standards might be
used for protectionist purposes, creating still, further, barriers for
products originating from developing countries.
The concept of labor standards encompasses certain situa-
tions, such as the worst forms of child labor and forced or com-
pulsory labor, which should be treated with very strict disci-
plines, in the proper forum. The International Labor Organiza-
tion ("ILO") Conventions address these issues. Although it is
often claimed that the ILO has no "teeth," the moral and politi-
cal weight of condemnation or censure by that body should not
be underestimated. Recent instances have shown that countries
are prepared to go a long way, even in accepting external gui-
dance and monitoring, to avoid such criticism. Other situations
that are sometimes implicitly included under the concept of la-
bor standards are not so clear (e.g., low wages). It is a corner-
stone of liberal economics, which provides for the conceptual
framework in which the WTO operates, that production should
be allocated according to the relative price of factors, such as
wages. It would not be logical to punish countries -that attract
investment and can export more because of these comparative
advantages. Non-compliance with adequate labor standards is
not regarded by developing countries as a development strategy.
Social degradation limits development perspectives on the long
run. Trade sanctions, however, certainly are not the best way to
promote labor standards.
The ILO has developed a new concept: decent work, work
carried out in conditions of freedom, equity, security, and
human dignity for all women and men. The ILO sees the
achievement of this objective of decent work as a synthesis of
four strategic objectives: (1) achieving universal respect for fun-
damental principles and rights at work; (2) the creation of
greater employment and income opportunities for women and
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men; (3) extending social protection, and; (4) promoting social
dialogue.
These are' adequate grounds for the discussions. However,
one point must be retained: as a rule, enhanced market access
opportunities improve labor standards-since they generate
more demand for work-and consequently lead to increases in
wages and salaries; along with other benefits. That is the correct
approach. The mere establishment of multilateral norms in a
body'meant to discipline trade relations will not ensure any im-
provement in the, situation of workers in developing countries.
Indeed, it might have the opposite effect. If producers find
themselves prevented from exporting because their labor stan-
dards are considered inadequate, the immediate consequence
will be increased unemployment and the diversion of resources
to other less remunerative activities destined to the internal mar-
ket. Income levels will fall and workers will be worse off.
Labor conditions also will have more adequate grounds to
flourish in tandem with progress in the political system and with
the promotion of democracy and related values. In fact, social,
economic, and political variables should be taken into account
when discussing this issue. The WTO is not the proper forum to
hold such discussion.
VI. PROSPECTS
The bottom line of the discussion on whether it is conve-
nient for developing countries to engage in a new round of ne-
gotiations lies in the fact that the gap between developed and
developing countries must be addressed. Some issues could, in
principle, be tackled in the implementation discussions now
under way. It is unlikely, however, that deeper concerns in sensi-
tive areas such as anti-dumping, subsidies, and agriculture might
be properly addressed without the context of broader negotia-
tions. This would justify, from the point of view of developing
countries, the quest for a new round, with two provisos: (i) that
it takes into account the development needs of developing coun-
tries and (ii) that it is well prepared (a second debacle is not
affordable).
There are some realities that cannot be eluded. The world
is rapidly changing. Instantaneous communication, business
transactions taking place at a very quick pace, and universal
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awareness of disparities in standards of living are an essential
part of our reality. But as they try to reform and modernize their
policies-not only in the area of trade, but in other sectors and
activities, extending from the environment to education and
from social security to health and culture-developing countries
are caught in a double bind: they have to learn how to operate
their business competitively in the age of the internet while they
struggle to overcome the obstacles to their more traditional ex-
ports. In other words, they need to live up to the standards of
the 21st century, even as they continue to face the problems of
the 19th century. The reply to the first of these challenges lies,
to a large extent, with developing countries themselves, al-
though a friendly international environment-one that facili-
tates and makes more predictable the flow of capital and tech-
nology-is also essential. As to the latter-the obstacles to their
more traditional exports-the responsibility lies squarely with
the international community and, in particular, with the indus-
trialized countries.
A rule-based trading system is essential for that purpose.
That is why the "doom and gloom" about the WTO, which fol-
lowed Seattle, rather than the real impasses of the negotiation,
which can in the end be solved on the basis of good-will and
enlightened self-interest, may be so pernicious.
